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Purpose: This paper explores online sharing of copyrighted content over peer-to-peer (p2p) file 
sharing networks and its impact on the music industry, and assesses the viable business models for 
the industry going forward. 
Design/Methodology/Approach: We analyze the evolution of the online content market over the 
years that followed the widespread adoption of p2p. The paper is based on a Teaching Case by the 
authors, and builds on two related academic papers that provide the theoretical underpinnings for 
the analysis.1 
Findings: Based on the early developments observed in this marketplace and the aforementioned 
theoretical work we argue that it is unfeasible to fully eradicate p2p, and so the industry must 
embrace it by understanding how consumers derive value from the technologies that enable it. 
Originality/Value: The developments analyzed here offer relevant insights for the online content 
marketplace, allow us to better understand the scope of strategies available to the music industry, 
and may provide lessons for other industries transitioning to online business models. 
Keywords: Peer-to-Peer, File Sharing, Online Distribution, Music Industry, Business Models 
Paper type: Case study 
1. Introduction 
Online sharing of content by consumers became mainstream with the release of Napster in 1999, 
and continued to thrive over subsequent peer-to-peer (p2p) file sharing networks such as eMule and 
BitTorrent. The phenomenon generated a public debate in developed countries over its impact on the 
creative industries, where business models were being transformed by online sharing and digital 
distribution. The music industry was arguably the most affected, since music recordings first spurred 
widespread adoption of file sharing on Napster, and was also the first to develop new online 
distribution channels for consumers to access and purchase music. The music industry´s response to 
online sharing thus presents an interesting case study to understand the business models that firms in 
the creative industries may adopt to confront the challenges brought by digitalization. 
The literature on p2p file sharing has mostly focused on the technical aspects of p2p architectures. 
Some studies have explored the real-world performance of file sharing networks, such as the early 
work of Adar and Huberman (2000) and Asvanund et al. (2004). These studies measured the extent of 
congestion faced by file sharing users, which is mainly driven by users that freeride by consuming 
the resources provided by others without supplying any in return. A large body of literature has 
developed theoretical models to understand the performance of file sharing networks and deter 
freeriding, such as the contributions of Antoniadis et al. (2004), Cunningham et al. (2004), Feldman et 
al. (2004), Golle et al. (2001), and Ranganathan et al. (2003). While some of the solutions proposed 
                                                          
1 This paper draws from our Teaching Case coauthored with Jordan Mitchell, see Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2006). The 
theoretical underpinnings are developed in two related papers, Casadesus-Masanell et al. (2008) and Casadesus-Masanell and 
Hervas-Drane (2009). 
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have been incorporated into p2p applications and improved their performance, the literature has 
mainly focused on p2p networks in isolation, without taking into account how they interact and 
compete with other content distribution models. 
In economics, another strand of the literature has focused on the impact of file sharing on the sales 
of music recordings in physical formats (CDs). Contributions in this area include Liebowitz (2006), 
Rob and Waldfogel (2006), Obelholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007), and Zentner (2006). Most of these 
studies have found that online sharing has a negative impact on sales. However, the literature has 
paid little attention to the interaction of p2p and commercial initiatives based on digital distribution. 
This is important because digital distribution is a closer substitute to online sharing than physical 
formats. In addition, digital distribution enables new business models that were previously 
unfeasible due to the constraints of physical distribution. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane 
(2010) model the competitive interaction of p2p and digital distribution such as iTunes. In this paper, 
we build on this previous work to assess the viable business models for the music industry in the 
new digital environment. 
We start by reviewing the fundamental characteristics of p2p file sharing in the next section, 
providing an overview of the technology and the main software applications that have driven file 
sharing traffic over the last decade, and discuss the economic factors that explain the success of file 
sharing networks. In Section 3 we review the music industry’s response to online sharing, 
characterized by a legal campaign against online sharing users, intermediaries and software 
developers, and by the deployment of new online distribution initiatives. While several of these 
industry-sponsored initiatives failed to gain traction in the marketplace, Apple’s iPod and iTunes 
combination was largely considered a success. We discuss how online sharing contributes to explain 
the different levels of success observed across these industry initiatives. In Section 4 we summarize 
the value propositions of p2p and successful industry initiatives such as iTunes, and conclude by 
reviewing the strategic implications for the industry going forward. 
2. Background on Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Networks 
Contrary to a client-server model, in which central servers provided resources or files for client 
computers, a peer-to-peer network referred to a network architecture in which all computers were 
interconnected to share resources amongst one another. In p2p networks, resources could be accessed 
directly from anyone in the network and a peer could act as both the provider and requestor of 
resources.1 In p2p file sharing networks, individuals could search other people’s computers for 
digital files, enabling online sharing of content on a large scale. 
Individuals in p2p file sharing networks could choose to either share files or not.  The first type of 
user, called a “sharer,” made downloaded files on their PC available to others in the network. The 
second type of user, referred to as a “freerider,” elected to not share any files on their PC. Users were 
engaged in “uploading” and/or “downloading,” – uploading involved sending a file to others in the 
network, while downloading was the process of receiving the file from someone else in the network. 
Sharers were involved in both uploading and downloading, while freeriders would only engage in 
downloading. 
Download speeds in a p2p network depended on the number of people in the network trying to 
access a file and on the number of sharers supplying the file and the speed of their Internet 
connection. In ideal circumstances, broadband connections permitted users to download a song 
(about three to four megabytes) in a matter of minutes, 100 megabyte file in less than one hour and a 
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high quality full movie motion picture (several 100 megabytes) in about three hours. Music files 
varied in format, and the most commonly traded format on p2p networks was MP3.  MP3 was 
developed in 1997 and was the most popular file format for digital music offering near CD quality. 
Users could easily copy and listen to MP3 files on computers and dedicated MP3 devices with no 
playback restrictions, and could convert them to any other format without limitation.  
As of early 2006, it was estimated that over 10 million users participated in p2p file sharing 
networks worldwide at any given time swapping over 10,000,000 GB (10 Petabytes) of data.2 More 
than 500 million downloads of p2p file sharing software had been logged since 1999.3 Bay TSP, an 
organization dedicated to tracking illegal file sharing, estimated that two of the top networks had five 
million users per day with access to a total of 750 million files.4 Big Champagne, another organization 
tracking p2p usage, found that as of September 2005, 9.3 million users worldwide were logged onto 
p2p networks at any one time, up from 6.7 million in September 2004 and 4.3 million in September 
2003.5 Another study by CacheLogic calculated that 61.44 per cent of all files downloaded over p2p 
networks were movies and videos, whereas 11.34 were audio tracks and the remainder being made 
up of software and documents.6  It was estimated that between 50 and 60 per cent of Internet traffic in 
Europe and the U.S. was accounted for by p2p file sharing.7 While file sharing had greatly increased 
ISP’s costs due to greater global traffic, it also stimulated broadband demand. ISPs had avoided 
taking any legal stand on the subject and had silently continued to upgrade their network 
infrastructure. 
Client Software 
We next provide a brief overview of the most popular p2p networks. The release of Napster in 
1999 quickly brought p2p into the mainstream, and several generations of p2p software applications 
were subsequently released to improve on Napster´s limitations and capture a share of the growing 
p2p user base. The most successful were eDonkey/eMule and BitTorrent, although other notable 
networks include FastTrack (used by Kazaa, Morpheus and Grokster) and Gnutella. 
Napster  Created by 19-year-old Shawn Fanning in a Northeastern college dorm room in 1999, 
Napster was a software program that allowed users to swap music files. In Napster’s design, a central 
server was used to index all of the users who were online at a given time.  When one user performed 
a search, the central server would query all of the other users who had the file. The searching user 
was notified when a match was made, and that user could begin the download. p2p adoption grew 
quickly with the introduction of Napster, and from 1999 to 2002 Napster’s software was downloaded 
70 million times. One estimate believed that 85 per cent of U.S. college students were involved in 
some way with online music swapping at the height of Napster’s popularity.8 
Becoming the ‘hottest’ software on the planet had its downside, however. Record companies, 
musicians and the Recording Industry Association of America, a membership group aimed at 
protecting music copyrights, rallied together to contest Napster claiming that the network was 
seriously infringing copyrighted material. In 2000, Napster was ordered to be shut down by a San 
Francisco federal court.9 Although Napster appealed the decision in early 2001, the appeals court 
upheld the prior ruling. Napster’s ownership of the central server was seen as the final nail in the 
coffin. By late 2001, Napster had $101 million in liabilities (including past copyright fees to major 
record labels) and attempted to change its service to a subscription basis.10 However, Napster did not 
manage to obtain the necessary licenses from the major labels, and finally sold its remaining assets to 
Roxio Inc. for $5 million.11 The majority of Napster’s users migrated quickly to other p2p networks.  
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Given the outcome of the legal proceedings, no other company had maintained a central server for a 
centralized p2p file sharing application. 
eDonkey and eMule  The eDonkey network was developed by Jed McCaleb in 2000 and began 
operation with central servers that were contributed and maintained by individuals, and not the 
author of the software as was the case with Napster. eDonkey was considered by industry experts to 
be efficient in maximizing network throughput and minimizing overhead traffic, allowing users to 
transfer larger files than in the past. As the network grew, an open-source project called eMule was 
initiated by Hendrik Breitkreuz with the intention of offering users enhanced features, such as a 
credit system to reward uploaders. eMule quickly became the number one software choice to link 
into the eDonkey network. eMule was an open-source community project and was supported solely 
by donations and the sale of merchandise such as the official eMule stuffed cuddly toy.12 As the 
network continued to grow and the limited number of servers available became a bottleneck, the 
network migrated to a decentralized architecture where peers would directly query each other to 
search for files and initiate downloads. This architecture no longer required central servers, and was 
very difficult to shut down through legal means.  Because users often connected and disconnected 
sporadically, speed and reliability of the network was not always great – but having no central hub it 
was very robust to attacks. 
BitTorrent  Developed by Bram Cohen in 2002, BitTorrent´s main advantage was speed, as 
users could download files at a quicker rate. This was enabled by a ‘tit-for-tat’ principle, meaning that 
a user had to upload in order to be able to download files.13 As BitTorrent stated on its website, “The 
key to scalable and robust distribution is cooperation.” (i.e. ‘Give and ye shall receive!’).”14 Just like 
eMule, the  BitTorrent development team lived off of donations from the user community and the 
sale of BitTorrent branded t-shirts.15 BitTorrent implemented a very particular centralized p2p 
architecture. Content search was not implemented; peers had to obtain links to content from an 
outside source (a webpage or another p2p network, for example). The link allowed the peer to 
connect to a predefined server managed by the providers of the content, called Tracker, and request 
the specified content from other connected peers; no other content indexed by the Tracker was 
visible. In this sense BitTorrent was not a self-sufficient network (and some industry analysts thought 
that it should not be considered a network), but excelled at delivering high download speeds and 
sustaining performance under heavy demand. 
Understanding the Success of p2p 
Several reasons were sighted for users involved with file sharing as opposed to purchasing a CD 
or DVD. One, the majority of p2p software programs were free and aside from the Internet 
connection, no additional charge was levied for accessing or sharing files.  Second, many individuals 
were able to find a certain song or movie as easily as performing a Google search. p2p users don’t 
have to leave their home and the availability is 24 hours, 7 days a week. Third, users could access 
greater variety of content in comparison to traditional distribution channels, including materials such 
as live performances, rarities, or basement recordings not distributed widely.  One example of this 
would be the Icelandic band Sigur Ros, whose popularity soared within the independent pop scene 
after their files were swapped on p2p networks. Fourth, there were no restrictions on p2p files – users 
could use the files as they saw fit. In a study conducted at MIT, the top three most important 
attributes for p2p users were considered to be “charges no fee,” “is fast,” and “is stable.”  The three 
least important were, “has points for uploading,” “supports only legal files,” and “has voice 
connection.”16  
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It was estimated that broadly 70 per cent of users on p2p networks were “freeriders” i.e., they did 
not allow others in the network to access their files.17 However, what would be the incentive to 
become a sharer and contribute to the network? Naturally, there would only be a few incentives. One 
may be a moral obligation of ‘giving’ in order to ‘receive.’ Another may be wanting to promote one’s 
own personal collection – this is more important in smaller affinity communities (i.e., promoting 
one’s own band or becoming the definitive source for a specific type of music) than swapping massive 
Top 40 hits. Contributing with one’s free will, however, produces a high number of “freeriders” in 
big networks, and it is an empirical fact that freeriding worsens with network size, see Asvanund et 
al. (2004). 
Sharing content is costly for users. Peers incur positive costs to participate in the p2p network; 
these are the costs of the computing resources and the bandwidth required to remain connected to 
the network until a download is completed. Sharers bear additional costs: possible expected costs of 
legal action against the peer, additional computing resources such as storage space, and upload 
bandwidth. When a peer in a p2p network decides to share content, he/she is effectively supplying 
two different goods. First, he/she provides content. Second, he/she is supplying upload bandwidth 
to the network, which alleviates network congestion. Obviously, the peer who shares does not benefit 
from the content that he/she is sharing as he/she already owns it. In general content is not a scarce 
resource on popular p2p networks, which tend to offer more variety than legal online alternatives. In 
the absence of social preferences (altruism and reciprocity for example), sharing has no direct benefit 
to the peer who shares. Sharing results in lower congestion if upload bandwidth is a scarce resource.  
The decision to share or to freeride will be based on a cost-benefit analysis. Since the costs of 
sharing are larger than those of freeriding, if there are no additional benefits from sharing, most peers 
will freeride. Clearly, if only a few people share, then there will be limited content, which will 
hamper the usefulness of the network. If everybody was a freerider, p2p networks would cease to 
exist.  
Freeriders create congestion on p2p networks. If only a limited number of people are sharing a 
file, then the queue for downloading that file increases when everyone else is a “freerider.” In fact, if 
the network has only a small proportion of peers who share content, congestion can be so great that 
the network becomes unusable. Developers of p2p applications such as eMule and BitTorrent have 
striven to make sharing more attractive, implementing credit systems and “tit-for-tat” principles that 
reward sharers with higher download speeds. As a consequence, a larger proportion of users are 
“sharers” on these p2p networks as compared to others that did not implement such mechanisms, 
and this reduces congestion and makes more content available, contributing to their success. 
Other developments in the industry may also contribute to increase sharing: 
 Greater access to broadband Internet connections;   Decreases in the cost of hard disk storage and computing resources; and   The permeation of more sophisticated p2p software applications (anonymity may soon be 
possible). 
 
These three developments render “sharing” less costly and, thus, contribute to the diffusion of 
p2p file sharing networks. Furthermore, the emergence of a peer-to-peer file sharing culture is 
evidenced by the growing number of webpages publishing and indexing content on these networks.  
We summarize the above discussion using a causal loop diagram, as introduced by Casadesus-
Masanell and Ricart (2010). Figure 1 illustrates the main factors driving value creation in a p2p 
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network. Solid arrows indicate positive relationships and dashed arrows indicate negative 
relationships: 
 
Figure 1. Dynamics of content provision and congestion in p2p file-sharing networks 
 
To conclude our analysis of p2p, it is important to ask how many p2p networks we should expect 
to observe on the market. As of early 2006, there were four main networks: eDonkey, BitTorrent, 
FastTrack, and Gnutella. In the long term, the answer to this question will depend on the network 
effects present. In particular, is the value of a p2p network increasing with its user base? Or is there a 
point where the value gains in content variety are offset by the costs of increased congestion? 
 
The trade off in a growing p2p network is as follows: A larger p2p network increases the variety 
of content available and this pushes the network towards a winner-takes-all dynamic. However, a 
larger p2p network also means more congestion, due to the increase in freeriding. Larger p2p 
networks also attract legal attention, and security decreases due to the potential presence of malicious 
peers (we further discuss this aspect in the next section). This limits the winner-takes-all dynamic. 
Thus if the population of users willing to participate in online sharing is sufficiently large, we should 
expect a number of p2p networks to coexist. While p2p networks also compete on ease-of-use and 
sense of community, we feel the above factors are the most relevant. 
3. The Music Industry and Online Distribution 
The music industry was approximately $40 billion worldwide each year.18 The Recording Industry 
Association of America (RIAA) estimated U.S. retail sales to total $11.4 billion in 2004, down from the 
record breaking $13.2 billion in 2000.19 Copious amounts of airtime had been given to p2p’s effect on 
music industry players.  Some industry participants felt that p2p file sharing was destroying the 
industry. The RIAA claimed that piracy cost the industry $4.2 billion each year on a worldwide 
basis.20 Others, such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (an organization offering intellectual and 
legal support to p2p software companies) and numerous consumer groups, felt that p2p represented 
unmatched possibilities and opportunity.  
The Major Record Labels and the RIAA 
There were four major record labels that controlled approximately 75 per cent of the worldwide 
market of wholesale music sales. They were Universal Music Group ($7 billion in sales), EMI Group 
($4 billion), Warner Music Group ($2.5 billion) and the recently merged Sony BMG Music 
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Entertainment ($5 billion). The major labels had typically lagged in embracing past technologies 
dating back to the advent of the cassette tape. When the record labels saw that blank cassette sales 
were rising in the 1980s, the major labels claimed “home tapping is killing music,” and lobbied for an 
extra tax on blank cassettes that would be distributed amongst the labels. 
The RIAA was a membership group made up of U.S. record companies that sold roughly 90 per 
cent of all music and audio in the country. The RIAA was originally established in 1952, and became 
the central group responsible for collecting and distributing license fees and royalties on copyrighted 
audio material.  As of 2006, the organization stated its raison d’etre: “to foster a business and legal 
climate that supports and promotes our members' creative and financial vitality.”21  
The RIAA had been at the centre of the battle against p2p networks, first starting with lawsuits 
against MP3.com in 1997, a website that facilitated the distribution of music in MP3 format, then 
Diamond Media in 1998 for their MP3 player and then Napster in 1999.22 The RIAA continued on 
with lawsuits against other p2p software and networks, suing Kazaa, Morpheus and Grokster in 2001 
but to little avail.23 In 2003, a Los Angeles court ruled that Grokster was not liable for copyright 
infringement. In 2003, the RIAA had launched lawsuits against 261 individuals24 and over 2,000 other 
individuals in the following two years, while enjoying some success in settling with individuals for 
copyright infringements. 
The Grokster case rose to the U.S. Supreme Court and became known in the press as MGM v. 
Grokster, even though there were 28 plaintiffs with MGM (a motion picture company) taking the 
lead.  In the U.S. Supreme Court decision in June 2005, the judges sided with MGM stating in the 
written ruling: “We hold that one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright ... is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”25 The plaintiffs 
were delighted with the ruling and used the opportunity to launch more lawsuits against individuals.  
The Industry’s Online Distribution Initiatives 
With the Internet, the major labels had been involved in promoting music online to varying 
degrees since 1995. Early on, all of the labels had set up corporate websites and had used the web to 
promote new albums and artists. All of the majors set up their own Internet initiatives to sell 
prepackaged CDs, teamed up with other online shops or attempted to offer digital music directly to 
consumers. Online initiatives included GetMusic, a joint venture between Universal and BMG and 
Total E, a joint venture between Sony and Warner.  EMI took a different tack by purchasing part 
ownership in Musicmaker.com, an online site that offered custom CDs for $9.95 with $1.00 for each 
additional song.  Musicmaker.com as well as the other initiatives did not succeed on the marketplace, 
however, and were rolled into other projects. 
The next attempt was for the labels to team up to offer streamed or downloaded music for a 
subscription fee. MusicNet was made up of three majors Warner Music, BMG (at the time separate 
from Sony), EMI and Real Networks. Founded in 1999, MusicNet had two service packs offered in 
coordination with America Online (AOL): the first was for $17.95 per month giving listeners 
unlimited streaming to Billboard’s Top 200 songs and permission to download and burn 10 tracks per 
month. The second pack was for $8.95 that allowed streaming only. When launched in 2003, 
MusicNet@AOL did not permit individuals to transfer music to portable devices. The service had 
captured 250,000 subscribers by March 200426 and had invited a number of new distribution partners 
such as Virgin Digital, HMV and Trans World Entertainment.  Also, the merger of BMG Music with 
Sony Music meant that Sony had become part owner of the company. In April 2005, MusicNet was 
sold to Baker Capital, a private equity firm based in New York with $1.5 billion under management.  
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At the time of acquisition, MusicNet had 1.3 million tracks and offered its music through Yahoo, AOL 
and Virgin Digital.27 
The second initiative was Pressplay – an alliance between Universal and Sony as well as 
contributions from Microsoft. When Pressplay was launched in 2001, it allowed music fans unlimited 
streaming and downloading for $9.95 per month. For $17.95, an individual could also make 10 
portable downloads per month. The service was marketed through MSN, Yahoo! Music and 
MP3.com. In May 2003, Pressplay was sold to Roxio, a digital media vendor, for $12.5 million in cash 
and 3.9 million shares in Roxio common stock.  Roxio had also purchased the defunct Napster and in 
October 2003, re-launched Napster as a subscription music service using Pressplay’s infrastructure.28  
The music industry’s initiatives made heavy use of digital content restrictions. With the 
acceptance of the MP3 file format, the content industry and technology companies started developing 
digital protection systems, widely referred to as DRM (Digital Rights Management). Common types 
of DRM included digital watermarking, whereby the purchaser’s information would be logged into 
the digital medium, and product activation, whereby the product could not be used until legally 
registered. Another form of DRM included encrypted codes on CDs and DVDs, which restricted 
copying or playing in certain regions. The goals were to provide consumers with digital music, while 
protecting copyrights.  
Industry observers and consumer organizations critized DRM schemes as an opportunity for 
record and technology companies to try and establish a monopoly over digital music and reduce 
opportunities for music lovers to “fair use” of their purchased tracks. Pundits pointed out that 
without “fair rights” as part of the Copyright Act, demonstrations as simple as whistling a song on 
the street or quoting a line from the Simpsons to a friend over email could result in copyright 
infringement.  They argued that “fair rights” were necessary for everyday life as well as future 
innovations and competition.29  
Apple Computer: the iPod Digital Player and the iTunes Store 
Borne from within the iconic computer technology company Apple, the iPod digital music player 
was released in 2001. Initially offered for $399 with the ability to store 1,024 songs, the iPod far 
exceeded the storage capabilities of competing MP3 players on the market at the time, which offered 
space for around 50 songs. The iPod launched together with Apple’s iTunes online store to support 
this storage capacity, offering music lovers the opportunity to buy songs at $0.99 each.  
In launching iTunes in tandem with the iPod, the CEO of Apple Computers, Steve Jobs, spent 18 
months convincing record company executives that the music would be protected.  Eventually, he got 
all of the “big five” to agree (at the time these were Universal, EMI, Warner, Sony, and BMG).  Jobs 
idea was to give “revolutionary rights” to music consumers, meaning that after purchasing the song 
from iTunes, the listener could enjoy it with their iPod, load it on to their computer and make a CD of 
the tracks. The purchaser of an iTunes track was permitted to load the song on a maximum of five 
different computers or burn the song on a maximum of five CDs. There were no subscription fees 
involved, but iTunes tracks were restricted from being played on other MP3 players. Thus 
individuals filled their iPods with music from both iTunes and other sources – both legal and illegal. 
Out of the 42 million iPods30 in existence, it was estimated that over 40 billion songs were in flotation 
of which 850 million had been purchased from iTunes as of the end of 2005.31 All iPod models 
collectively sold 32 million units in 2005.32 This meant that iPod controlled nearly 70 to 80 per cent of 
the digital player market.33 While the iPod had profit margins of over 60%, songs sold through the 
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iTunes store were only marginally profitable to Apple but handsomely profitable to record 
companies. 
The iTunes-iPod combination was a success, and quickly gained market share against competing 
third-party pay-per-download or subscription-based services. Figure 2 illustrates the main factors 
driving value creation and value capture in Apple’s ecosystem: 
 
Figure 2. Apple’s logic of value creation and value capture 
In summary, Apple offered an easy-to-use system based on the seamless integration of hardware 
(iPod) and software (iTunes). This is substantially different from earlier approaches and those of 
competitors, which only had one (or promoted one) of the above components. The user experience 
was clearly at the center of Apple’s strategy, and was continually improved with new versions of 
iTunes launched with each major hardware upgrade. Apple also garnered the support of all major 
labels and several prominent independents, positioning iTunes as the one-stop legitimate online shop 
for digital music. And it implemented transparent DRM management, satisfying the requirements of 
record companies while being transparent to the user, who was generally only aware of its presence 
when trying to perform an unauthorized operation.  
4. Understanding How to Compete Against Online Sharing 
Apple’s solution became one of the most successful pay-for-download sites in operation, 
showcasing that it was possible for the music industry to compete against online sharing. As outlined 
in our discussion above, iTunes operated on a completely different premise than p2p networks, based 
on a client-server distribution model with tight integration of all stages of content delivery and 
consumption. Based on the successful iTunes model, we begin by summarizing the advantages and 
disadvantages of p2p vs. those of Legal Distribution: 
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p2p 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 It’s free  Variety of content  No restrictions on content (i.e, no DRM)  Constantly improving due to technological 
race  More people using it – increases availability 
of content and makes it harder to shut down 
 It’s under constant attack by industry players  Downloading time varies  Congestion problems (especially when 
network is large)  Sometimes content is unreliable (i.e., spoof 
files) 
 
 
Legal Distribution 
Strengths Weaknesses 
 Legal  Easy to use  High reliability  Metadata (i.e., information about the files)  Fast (i.e., no congestion problems)  Profitable for major labels  It has major label support  Better integration with music players 
 Customers must pay – relatively expensive 
with respect to p2p  Restrictions on content   Variety of content is lower 
 
The comparison reveals that neither of these content distribution models dominates the other in 
terms of user value created.  We should nonetheless expect some attributes to evolve over time. For 
example, with improved access to broadband, p2p networks will become less congested. In addition, 
continued legal attacks from the industry against sharers (and perhaps government intervention) is 
prone to further erode their legality. For legal distribution, three trends are likely to take place: prices 
may fall due to competition among a growing number of legal sites; more content will be made 
available (“rarer” groups and recordings already on p2p); and DRM restrictions may be lowered to 
better compete with p2p (or alternatively, hackers keep cracking restrictions of use.) 
To understand how Apple’s business model interacts with p2p, it is useful to analyze the 
interconnection between their causal loops. Figure 3 presents a model of such interactions.  
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Figure 3. Interactions between p2p and iTunes 
 
The representation reveals that Apple’s ecosystem benefitted from p2p file sharing while 
simultaneously reducing its comparative attractiveness for consumers. It benefitted from p2p file 
sharing because a larger volume of p2p usage implied that more consumers had digital content that 
could be consumed on iPods, increasing the willingness to pay for Apple’s hardware. It reduced the 
comparative attractiveness of p2p file sharing because a larger user base of iPods allowed Apple to 
continue to improve the iTunes store and its integration with the iPod, for example enabling the 
purchase of content directly from the device, introducing new content formats (e.g., videos, games), 
and personalizing the experience with content recommendations. This virtuous circle reinforced the 
attractiveness of the iTunes-iPod tandem in the marketplace. 
Our review of the online content market’s evolution and Apple’s strategy suggests that there are 
two main avenues open to the music industry when competing against online sharing: to destroy it 
by legal means, and to embrace it in their business models. Since both avenues are not mutually 
exclusive, the industry should pursue both. 
Could online sharing be eliminated? Towards this end, the industry could continue improving 
DRM, fighting p2p developers and users in courts, and working with ISPs and governments to block 
file sharing traffic. However, it is unavoidable that technology will continue to be developed to 
circumvent DRM restrictions and that p2p networks will prove resilient due to their decentralized 
architecture. Nonetheless, any reduction in p2p traffic or the content available on these networks 
would allow music industry players to appropriate a share of users’ lost value, so partial success 
should not be interpreted as a failure. 
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To embrace online sharing and monetize music recordings when competing with a “free“ good 
such as online sharing, the industry needs some key points to differentiate its offering - something 
that cannot be found in the free good. Apple’s iTunes found a way to fulfill this need, proving that 
the new digital environment requires new approaches to commercial distribution. The industry could 
also focus on revenue streams from ancillary products that feed from the success of music recordings, 
such as live performances, merchandise, and advertising (product placement for instance). Online 
sharing should be recognized as an opportunity to expand these complementary markets.  
Fully embracing online sharing calls for innovative approaches. By monitoring p2p activity, 
industry players can learn where and when content consumption takes place, gathering data that was 
not previously available over traditional commercial channels. This information could allow the 
industry to better fine-tune the touring of artists and the timing of commercial events. And besides 
trying to sell the tracks through download or subscription, the industry could also seek new content 
formats to capture value from music – music videos were created in the 1960s and became 
widespread in the 1980s, for instance. Are there no other forms of distributing music that lurk into the 
future?  
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